II. 关于它的废除，有三种观点：第一种是有缺陷的（重洗派和反律主义派，他们认为摩西律法中所有一切都是绝对的、简单的被废除）。因此，无论从《旧约》中得出的关于行政官和战争的权利的理由是什么，关于遗产的分割等等，他们都习惯于用这样一个答案来解决，即这些都是司法性的，与以色列人和旧约有关，但现在在新约中被废除了。第二种，是那些认为摩西律法仍然有效，应该保留，基督教国家应该像犹太人一样被治理（这是卡尔斯塔特Carlstadt 和卡斯特利奥Castellio的观点，路德宗的布罗赫曼Brochmann 同意他们的观点）。两者都偏离了事实。前者是因为许多道德律上的事会因此被废除，而这些东西是包含在司法律（forensic law）中。后者是，许多预表性的事将不得不被遵守，而这些东西对于我们这个时代的人来说是陌生的。第三种是正统派的观点，他们坚持中间立场，区分已经废除的事和仍然有效的事。
III. 在摩西律法中必须区分各种不同的目的。考虑到它是犹太国家与外邦人的区别，也是基督国度的预表，它被简单地废除了，因为在基督里不再有犹太人和外邦人的区别（加3:28；弗2:14）。考虑到犹太国家和政体已经被摧毁，所以不再需要一个预表性国度来暗示未来的基督国度，因为基督国度已经到来。但至于以色列人的良好秩序（eutaxian）或政府形式，不能说是被废除了，除非是相对而言。毫无疑问，我们应该准确的区分那些在法律中属于独特权利（particular right）的东西（在时间、地点和犹太民族方面特别适用于犹太人的事：如关于丈夫的兄弟、写离婚协议书、拾荒等的法律），和那些建立在所有人共同的自然法（natural law）之上的共同和普遍权利（common and universal right）的事（如关于审判和惩罚犯罪、关于寡妇、孤儿、陌生人等的法律，这些是道德上的和共同的权利）。至于前者，完全可以说是被废除了，因为犹太人的政体已经被剥夺了，与之有特殊关系的事也必然停止了。但对于后者，它仍然存在，因为它进入了道德和永久的法律的性质，并且不是作为简单的犹太人，而是作为与其他人一样受自然法（natural law）制约的人被命令。为了区分那些属于共同权利和特殊权利的事情，可以采用三项准则。
(1）不仅在犹太人中，而且在外邦人中流行的东西（遵循正确的理性之光）是共同的权利。因此，希腊人、罗马人和其他人都有自己的法律，其中有许多与神的法律相一致的地方（即使仅对不同人制定的摩西和罗马法进行比较，也可以看出这一点）。
(2) 发现符合十诫的内容，并有助于解释和符合十诫的内容。只要留意某项法律的目标和处理事务，或批准它们的原因，这就很容易收集到。
(3) 新约中重复的事情，鼓励基督徒也遵守的事。
IV. 在建立在共同权利或自然法基础上的司法律中，命令的内容（substance）必须与其处境（circumstances）区分开来。有些命令，无论是在实质上还是在处境上，都属于共同权利；然而，其他命令在实质上属于共同权利，但在处境上属于特殊权利。前者在所有部分都是永久的；而后者则只是相对的。因此，在关于惩罚犯罪的法律中，惩罚的实质是自然权利，但惩罚的方式和程度是特殊权利，因此是可以改变的。
V. 凡是与预表相混合的司法律，在其本身的性质上是可以改变的，所以是已经被废除的权利，因为它们形成的原因和基础是暂时的，而不是永久的。这就是关于长子继承权（申21:17）、庇护所（申19:2）、禧年、不播种不同种类的种子、不穿羊毛和亚麻布的衣服等法律。虽然它们可能也有政治目的，但它们仍然（因为它们是预表性的）因此而不再具有约束力。
VI. 适应犹太政体的司法律，不仅对生活在不同政体下的基督徒毫无用处，而且不能也不应该再遵守（如利未记的律法、关于嫉妒的律法、卖子的律法 [出21]、关于田地安息的律法、在各部落之间划分迦南地的律法等）。这些与以色列人及其政府有特殊的关系（schesin）。这一点既然已经被剥夺了，它们就不能再有任何用处。
VII. 政体被废除后，作为该政体基础的法律也必然被废除。这些法律是正面权利（positive right），只适用于犹太国家；但其他建立在自然权利（natural right）上的法律和十诫的附属品却没有废除。因此，建立在道德律基础上的关于一般决定的法律没有被废除；但关于涉及犹太国家的特殊决定则被废除了。
VIII. 司法律可以从形式上看（formally），即使其是为犹太人制定的（所以被废除了）；也可以从实质上看（materially），因为它与自然法一致并建立在它的基础上（所以它仍然存在）。
IX. 虽然最好和最明智的法律（就该民族的状况而言）是由上帝批准的，但这并不意味着它们应该是永久性的。从积极和自由的权利来看，上帝可以在具体的时间内，出于具体的原因，将这些法律赋予某个民族，而这些法律对其他民族就没有效力了。对一个人有好处的东西，对另一个人就不一定有好处。
X. 在各方面都优于其他法律的法律应该采纳（无论是抽象的还是具体的，无论是否定的还是肯定的）。但是，司法律比其他法律好，不是肯定的，而是否定的，因为它是针对某些现在不存在的情况而确立的。它比人类的法律好（仅仅是作为人类），不是因为人类法律是建立在自然法之上，因为自然法的来源也是上帝。因此，当罗马法优于摩西律法时，并不是因为它们是由人制定的，而是因为它们来自自然和共同的权利，可以更适合于不同地方、时间和个人。
图伦丁，《要义》11.26.2–10
————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
II. There are three opinions about its abrogation: the first in defect (of the Anabaptists and Antinomians, who think it is absolutely and simply abrogated as to all things). On this account, whatever reasons are drawn against them from the Old Testament for the right of the magistrate and of war; for the division of inheritances and the like, they are accustomed to resolve with this one answer—that these are judicial and pertain to the Israelite people and the Old Testament, but are now abrogated under the New. The second, in excess, of those who think that law is still in force and should be retained and that Christian states are to be governed like the Jewish (which was the opinion of Carlstadt and Castellio, with whom the Lutheran Brochmann agrees). Both wander from the truth. The former because thus many moral things would be abrogated which are contained in the forensic law. The latter because thus many typical things would have to be observed which are most foreign to the reason of our times. The third, of the orthodox, who, holding a middle ground, relieve the matter by a distinction, both according to what has been abrogated and according to what is still in force.
III. In that law various ends must be distinguished. For inasmuch as it was a distinction of the Jewish state from the Gentiles and a type of the kingdom of Christ, it is simply abrogated because there is no longer any distinction between the Jews and the Gentiles in Christ (Gal. 3:28; Eph. 2:14). As the Jewish state and polity has been destroyed, so there is no need of a type to adumbrate the future kingdom of Christ, since it has already come. But as to the good order (eutaxian) or form of government of the Israelite people, it cannot be said to have been abrogated, unless relatively. Undoubtedly those things are to be accurately distinguished which in the law were of particular right (which peculiarly applied to the Jews in relation to time, place and Jewish nation: such was the law concerning a husband’s brother, the writing of divorcement, the gleaning, etc.) from those which were of common and universal right, founded upon the law of nature common to all (such as the laws concerning trials and the punishment of crimes, widows, orphans, strangers and the like, which are of moral and common right). As to the former, they may well be said to have been abrogated because the Jewish polity having been taken away, whatever had a peculiar relation to it must also necessarily have ceased. But as to the latter, it still remains because it enters into the nature of the moral and perpetual law and was commanded to the Jews not as Jews simply, but as men subject with others to the law of nature. For distinguishing those things which are of common and particular right, a threefold criterion can be employed.
(1) That what prevails not only among the Jews, but also among the Gentiles (following the light of right reason) is of common right. Thus the Greeks, Romans and others had their own laws in which are many things agreeing with the divine laws (which even a comparison of the Mosaic and Roman law alone, instituted by various persons, teaches).
(2) What is found to be conformed to the precepts of the decalogue and serves to explain and conform it. This is easily gathered, if either the object and the matter of the laws or the causes of sanctioning them are attended to.
(3) The things so repeated in the New Testament that their observance is commended to Christians.
IV. In the laws founded upon the common right or the law of nature, the substance of the precept must be distinguished from its circumstances. Some, both as to substance and as to circumstances, are of common right; others, however, are as to substance of common right, but as to circumstances of particular right. The former are perpetual in all parts; the latter, on the other hand, only relatively. Thus in the laws concerning the punishment of crimes, the substance of the punishment is of natural right, but the manner and degree of punishment is of particular right and on that account mutable.
V. Whatever forensic laws are mixed with types are in their own nature changeable and so have been abrogated of right because their causes and foundations are temporary, not perpetual. Such are the laws concerning the right of primogeniture (Dt. 21:17), asylums (Dt. 19:2), the Jubilee, the not sowing of fields with different kinds of seed, the not wearing garments of wool and linen and the like. Although they might have had a political end also, they still (because they were typical) cease to bind on that very account.
VI. The forensic laws accommodated to the genius and reason of the Jewish polity were not only made useless to Christians living under a different polity, but neither can, nor ought to be observed any longer (such as the Levirate law, the law of jealousy, the law of the selling of a son [Ex. 21], the law concerning the rest of fields, dividing the land of Canaan between the tribes and the like). These had a peculiar relation (schesin) to the Israelite people and its government. This having been taken away, they can have no further use.
VII. The polity having been abolished, the laws must necessarily be abolished upon which that polity was founded. They are of positive right and referred simply to the Jewish state; but not forthwith the others founded in natural right and appendages to the decalogue. Therefore, the forensic law as to general determinations, founded upon the moral law, is not abrogated; but as to special determination, which concerned the state of the Jews, is abrogated.
VIII. The forensic law may be viewed either formally, as it was enacted for the Jews (and so is abrogated); or materially, inasmuch as it agrees with the natural law and is founded on it (and thus it still remains).
IX. Although the best and wisest laws (as far as the state of that people was concerned) were sanctioned by God, it does not follow that on this account they ought to be perpetual. God, from positive and free right, could give them for a certain time and for certain reasons, to some one nation, which would not have force with respect to others. What is good for one is not immediately so for another.
X. What is better than others in every way (in both the abstract and the concrete and both negatively and affirmatively) is to be preferred to the others. But the forensic law is better than other laws, not affirmatively, but negatively because it was determined to certain circumstances which do not now exist. Then again it is better than human laws (simply as human), but not inasmuch as they are founded upon the natural law, whose source is God. Therefore, when the Roman laws are preferred to the Mosaic, they are not preferred simply as enacted by men, but as derived from natural and common right they can be more suitable to places, times and persons.
FRANCIS TURRETIN, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 11.26.2–10